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EMPLOYERS BEWARE! NEGLIGENCE IN THE SELECTION OF
AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR CAN SUBJECT YOU TO
LEGAL LIABILITY
Linda S. Calvert Hanson*
BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE
The long established doctrine of respondeat superior or imputed negligence
provides that employers can be held vicariously liable in tort law for the
negligence of their employees under various circumstances. It is premised on
the notion that one who is in a position to exercise control over the performance
of a service must exercise it or bear the loss.' An employee is usually regarded
as a member of the employer's staff and subject to the control of the employer.'
The employee's tortious acts committed within the scope of his employment,
resulting in liability are therefore, imputed to the employer due to the working
relationship that exists between the parties.'
Generally, the employer of an independent contractor is immune from
vicarious liability for damages to a third party for the negligent acts of the
contractor, committed during the performance of the agreement.4 An inde-
pendent contractor is commonly defined as one who contracts to perform a
certain task or duty independently according to their own means and methods
without being subject to the control of the hiring party except as to the ultimate
Assistant Professor, Criminal Justice and Legal Studies Department, University of Central Florida;
Of Counsel, Law Office of J. Michael Davis, Gainesville, Florida,; B.A., 1983, University of Florida; J.D.,
1986, University of Florida; Member of the Florida Bar.
The author expresses her gratitude for insightful comments provided by Dr. Thomas E. Durkin,
Assistant Professor of Criminology and Law at the University of Florida and J. Michael Davis, Visiting
Assistant Professor of Criminology and Law at the University of Florida.
I W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, § 71, at 500 (5th
ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter PROSSER ON TORTS].
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 2(1)-(2) (1958).
3 Id.
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS, § 409, (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 219,
(1958); PROSSER ON TORTS, supra, note 2 at 501-516. Many commentators have noted that this general rule
is almost at the point where the exceptions have swallowed the rle. For example, in Henderson Brothers
Stores, Inc. v. Smiley, 120 Cal. App. 3d 903, 174 Cal. Rptr. 875 at 878 (Ct App. Cal. 1981) the district court
of appeals discussed this phenomena by citing to many authorities before concluding that " ... it seems
proper to say that nonliability is now the exception: i.e., the so-called general rule is followed only where no
good reason is found for departing from it." See also, "Note, Risk Administration in the Marketplace: A
Reappraisal of the Independent Contractor Rule," 40 U. CHIC. L. REv. 661 at 675 (1973).
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goal or result.5 Historically, in circumstances where this level of independence
existed, the imposition of liability on the hiring entity who only exercised
limited control over the method in which the contracted work was performed
resulted in inequity. As Dean Prosser explained, the work is to be "regarded as
the contractor's own enterprise, and he, rather than the employer, is the proper
party to be charged with the responsibility for preventing the risk, and
administering and distributing against it."6 The distinction between an
"employee" and an "independent contractor" therefore, can become a critical
liability issue to the hiring entity.7
Three significant exceptions to the nonliability doctrine for independent
contractors exist. 8 The first exception is premised on the supposition that
certain of the employer's responsibilities are so important to the community that
they are deemed to be non-delegable duties, even when that task is done by an
independent contractor.' This doctrine holds the employer vicariously liable for
the negligence of the independent contractor even given a showing that the
employing party exercised due care. Examples of this exception based on non-
delegability include: the duty of the government to maintain highways and
roads, a railroad's duty to maintain safe tracks and crossings, the duty to
provide safe working environments for employees, and the duty to provide a
reasonably safe premises for business visitors.'0
s Eg., 41 Am. JUR. 2d, Independent Contractors § 1 (1968); Washington Pattern Jury Instr. 3d Civil
§50.11 (1989).
6 PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 2 at 509.
7 This statement is not meant to infer that this is the only possible relationship. The principal-agent
relationship permeates case law and can impact on such important issues as whether or not the agent acting
on behalf of the principal can subject the principal to liability for the agents acts or omissions to act. This
aspect of agency law, however, is beyond the scope of this article. For example, hospitals as one class of
employer in particular, continue to struggle to discriminate between whether its staff physicians are agents
(for whose acts they can be held liable) or whether they are independent contractors (for whose acts they will
not normally be liable) in the medical malpractice context. See eg., Jack W. Shaw, Jr., Annotation, Hospital
Liability for Negligence in Selection or Appointment of Staff Physician or Surgeon, 51 A.L.R. 3d 981 (1973);
"Albain v Flower Hospital: Halting the Expansion of Hospital liability for Negligence of Physicians in Ohio,"
19 N. KY. L REV. 393 (Winter, 1992); Dr. Malcolm A. Meyn, Jr., "The liability of Physicians Who Examine
for Third Parties," 19 N. KY. L REv. 333 (Winter, 1992); Comment, "Hospital Vicarious Liability for the
Negligence of Independent Contractors and Staff Physicians: Criticisms of Ostensible Agency Doctrine," 56
U. CiN. L REv. 711 (1987); and John Dwight Ingram, "Liability of Medical Institute for the Negligence of
Independent Contractors Practicing on their Premises," 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 221 (1994).
8 41 Am. Jug. 2d, Independent Contractors §24 (1968).
9 REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, § 416 et seq. and Topic 2 Introductory Note, at 394 (1965);
PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 2, at § 71, 511-12. Prosser explains that the non-delegable duty can be
imposed by statutes or ordinances, contracts, and by common law.
1o Id.
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A second exception involves situations where the independent contractor
performs work likely to be a peculiar risk" or an inherently dangerous
function. 2 The essence of these phrases is that given the nature of the task a
high degree of danger to others can result absent special precautions. 3
Circumstances demonstrating this hazardous situation exclusion include: a case
wherein the Department of Defense contracted with an independent contractor
for the disposal of oil contaminated with toxic chemicals from a Florida
military installation, 4 a case involving the construction of a dam,' 5 and a case
in which a private company produced antitank explosives for the government.
16
The justification advanced for these two exceptions, non-delegable duty and
inherently dangerous work, is that it would be unconscionable if the employer
escaped liability for burdensome obligations merely by contracting out or
shifting their responsibility to the independent contractor.'
7
The hiring party's personal negligence triggers the third exemption. That
is, after engaging an independent contractor, the employer may still face
exposure to independent liability as opposed to vicarious liability, should the
employer personally conduct himself in a negligent manner.18 The thrust of this
11 See Russell L. Wald, "Liability of Employer of Independent Contractor under 'Peculiar Risk'
Doctrine, 7 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 477 (1990).
12 See 41 AM. JUR. 2d, Independent Contractors §41 (1968) and Jonathan M. Purver, "Inherently
Dangerous Nature of Work Performed by Independent Contractor, 34 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 483
(1983).
13 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 427 (1965); PRossER ON TORTS, supra note 2, at § 71, 512;
Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Liability of Employer with Regard to Inherently Dangerous Work for
Injuries to Employees ofIndependent Contractor, 34 A.LR. 4th 914 (1984); "Liability to Employees of Inde-
pendent Contractor Engaged in Inherently Dangerous Work: A Workable Workers Compensation Proposal,"
48 FORDHAM L REv. 1165 (1980); Jonathan M. Purver, "Inherently Dangerous Nature of Work Performed
by Independent Contractor," 34 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FAcTS 2d 483 (1983).
14 Dickerson, Inc. v. United States, 875 F.2d 1577 (11 th Cir. 1989).
Is Lipka v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 213 (N.D. N.Y. 1965).
16 Toole v. United States, 443 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
17 Alan O. Sykes, "The Economics of Vicarious Liability," 93 YALELJ. 1231 at n.122 (June 1984).
1" The Restatement identifies a number of categories which fall within the exception that the status
of employing an independent contractor does not absolve the hiring entity from its own personal negligence.
Examples of situations in which the employer of an independent contractor can be liable for its own acts
include when the employer fails to exercise reasonable care in: 1) giving instructions to the independent
contractor as to how the work is to be accomplished [RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 410, (1965)]; 2)
engaging only independent contractors competent to safely perform the work [(RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, § 411, (1965)]; 3) inspecting the work while or after it is performed, to ensure that the work is done
so as to secure the safety of others [RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 412, (1965)]; 4) providing for
necessary precautions, by either the employer or the contractor to enable the work entrusted to the contractor
to be safely done when a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm could create dangers, absent language
in the contract [RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 413, (1965)]; 5) over areas in which the employer
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analysis will be to consider one aspect of the employer's independent liability
that can result from the negligent selection of an independent contractor."9 The
status of employing an independent contractor does not absolve the hiring party
from its personal negligence when the employer fails to exercise reasonable
care in engaging only independent contractors competent to safely perform the
work.20
This analysis will begin by defining the status of an independent contractor
before analyzing the negligent selection doctrine. It will discuss the class of
potential plaintiffs before scrutinizing a sampling of cases that have alleged this
retains control [RTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 414, (1965)]; 6) supervising the equipment and methods
of persons working upon his land when the land is held open to the public [RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, § 414A and 415, (1965)]. See also, - Annotation, Independent Contractors: Liability of Employer
as Predicated on the Ground of His Personal Fault, 30 A.L.R. 1502 (1924).
19 Policy considerations cited by Dean Prosser for imposing liability on the hiring party include that
"the enterprise is still the employer's, since he remains the person primarily to be benefitted by it; that he
selects the contractor and is free to insist upon one who is financially responsible, and to demand indemnity
from him, and that the insurance necessary to distribute the risk is properly a cost of his business." PROSSER
ON TORTS, supra, note 2 at 509. See also, Reuben I. Friedman, Annotation, When is Employer Chargeable
with Negligence in Hiring Careless, Reckless, or Incompetent Independent Contractor, 78 A.L.R. 3d 910
(1973); see also, Jack W. Shaw, Annotation, Hospital's Liability for Negligence in Selection or Appointment
of Staff Physician or Surgeon, 51 A.L.R. 3d 981 (1973); Frederick E. Felder, Lack Of Care In Selecting
Independent Contractor, 11 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 499 (1976).
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §411, (1965). Note also that the negligent selection of an
employee by an employer can provide the basis for liability independent of vicarious liability. Should an
employee lack the appropriate skills and subsequently perform his work incompetently which results in injury
to another, the employer can be deemed negligent in the selection of the employee for that particular task. See,
Western Stock Center, Inc. v Sevit, Inc., 195 Colo. 372, 578 P2d 1045 at 376, 1048 n.1 (1978); David P.
Chapus, Annotation, Liability of School Authorities for Hiring or Retaining Incompetent or Otherwise
Unsuitable Teacher, 60 A.L.R. 4th 260 (1988). The negligent selection theory whether applied to the hirer
of an employee or an independent contractor still can result in the direct imposition of liability on the hiring
entity. Negligent selection, however, must be set apart from the somewhat akin, more newly recognized tort
of negligent hiring. Negligent hiring, predicated on a respondeat superior basis alleges that an employer
negligently hired an employee who (in most circumstances) commits an intentional tort against an innocent
party while on the job, but outside of the scope of employment. The injured party claims that the employer
failed to make a proper inquiry into the employees background which would have revealed dangerous
propensities of the employee. Negligent hiring invokes the vicarious liability doctrine whereas negligent
selection of an incompetent independent contractor or employee utilizes the .direct liability concept. See e.g.,
Note, "Negligent Hiring-Holding Employers liable When Their Employees' Intentional Torts Occur Outside
of the Scope of Employment," 37 WAYNE L REV. 237 (Fall, 1990); Note, Employer iability Under the
Doctrine of Negligent Hiring: Suggested Methods for Avoiding the Hiring of Dangerous Employees, 13 DEL
J. CORP. L 501 (1988); Thomas R. Malia, Annotation, Security Guard Company's Liability for Negligent
Hiring, Supervision, Retention or Assignment of Guard, 44 A.L.R. 4th 620 (1986); John H. Derrick,
Annotation, Landlord's Tort Liability to Tenant for Personal Injury or Property Damage Resulting From
Criminal Conduct of Employee, 38 A.L.R. 4th 240 (1985); Note, Employer Liability for the Criminal Acts
of Employees Under Negligent Hiring Theory, 68 MINN L. REV. 1303 (1984).
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negligent selection cause of action to ascertain the level and type of inquiry
necessary to determine the competency of a contractor. Circumstances under
which courts are willing to impose liability for this malfeasance will be
examined to assess the potential legal exposure to the hiring party. Special
attention will be given to the unique situation that can arise when government
entities engage the services of independent contractors and assert the immunity
defense to challenges of an incompetent contractor. The article will conclude
with an assessment of mechanisms to avoid legal liability for this cause of
action and a prediction regarding the future expansion of this tort to include
recoveries from economic damages.
INDICIA OF THE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
RELATIONSHIP
Independent contractors perform a variety of beneficial labor to others. Part
of the need fulfilled by the hiring of an independent contractor is to provide
services that the employers themselves cannot provide whether due to lack of
knowledge or expertise, a lack of specialized equipment or a lack of trained
personnel to perform the needed services. Another inducement for contracting
for services is that the hiring entity is not required to pay social security taxes,
or benefits such as unemployment compensation,2 worker's compensation,22
retirement, or medical insurance. Instead, compensation is usually in a flat fee,
which can have distinct tax consequences for the hiring party.' An additional
21 See Donald A. Brenner, "The Employer's Fruitless Quest for Independent Contractor Status," 21
COLO. LAw. 459 (Mar. 1992) for a discussion of the Colorado Employment Security Act which provides that
employers must pay into unemployment benefit fund, however, the hirer of an independent contractor is not
required to pay the same tax. See also, Christopher J. Cotnoir, "Employees or Independent Contractors: A Call
For Revision of Maine's Unemployment Compensation 'ABC' Test," 46 MAINE L REv. 325 (1994).
2 This was true under the traditional view, however, some jurisdictions have altered this rle
statutorily. For discussions of this modification see eg., Note, "Workmen's Compensation Coverage on an
Independent Contractor - Determinative of Employee Status under the Alabama Workmen's Compensation
Act," 22 CumB. L REv. 787 (Spring 1992); Barbara P. Kozelka, "Independent Contractor's and Colorado's
Workers' Compensation Act, 22 COLO. L. 545 (Mar. 1993).
23 See eg., Robert K. Johnson and Stephen D. Rose, "Classification of Workers As Employees or
Independent Contractors: A Proposed Legislative Solution," 10 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 1 (Spring 1992) for a
discussion of the tax liability differences for employees as opposed to independent contractors. See also,
Steven M. Burke, "Implications of IRS Recharaeterization of Independent Contractors as Employees," 33
N.H. BJ. 307 (Mar. 1992); Thomas J. Dwyer, "That Control Thing: Employment Status of Worker Defines
Tax Obligation," 79 A.B.A. J. 90 (June 1993); Avery A. Neumark, "Employee vs. Independent Contractor
Status," 51 INsiTr. FED. TAX 7 (Jan. 1993); Myron Hulen, "Independent Contractors: Compliance and
Classification Issues," II AM J. TAX POL'Y 13 (1994); James L. Rigelhaupt, Annotation, 51 A.I.r. FED. 59,
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benefit is that employing an independent contractor may reduce the employers
susceptibility to legal liability.' Contract provisions routinely maintain that the
independent contractor will provide appropriate levels of insurance and that the
contractor will assume liability for tort actions. 5
The types of situations in which employers rely upon the assistance of an
independent contractor vary. Services provided by contractors range from the
more traditional timber removal to building contractors and subcontractors'
such as plumbers and electricians27 to independent truck and transport drivers,'
to repair technicians29 to landscapers and tree trimme 3  to painters to sales-
persons.3 More contemporary cases reveal an expansion in the use of
independent contractors into such areas as food service,32 pizza delivery
drivers,33 collection agencies, repossession services,' private security guards,35
Income Tax Withholding, What Constitutes Employer-Employee Relationship for Purpose of Federal Income
Tax Withholding, (1981).
24 See Rick A. Pacynski, "Legal Challenges in Using Independent Contractors," 72 MIcH. B.J. 671
(Sumer 1993).
2 The general rule is that employers cannot be vicariously liable for the intentional torts committed
by its employee. Note however, that there appear to be situations which can give rise to an imposition of
liability on the hiring party for the commission of intentional torts by an independent contractor. See eg.,
Robert A. Brazener, Annotation, Liability of One Contracting for Private Police or Security for Acts of
Personnel Supplied, 38 A.L.R. 3d 1332 (1971); 41 Am. JUR. 2d, Independent Contractors §21 (1968).
26 Western Stock Ctr., Inc. v Sevit, Inc., 95 Colo. 372, 578 P2d 1045 (1978Xregarding pipe salvage).
27 Page v. Sloan, 12 N.C. App. 433, 183 SE 2d 813 (Ct. App. N.C. 1971).
21 See eg., Foster Co. v. Humblad, 418 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1969); Hudgens v Cook Indust., Inc., 521
P2d 813 (OkI. 1973); Stone v Pinkerton Farms, Inc., 741 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1984); Donald L. Miler, H,
"Motor Carrier liability for Accidents Involving Lease Trucks and Drivers: Can You Avoid It?" 61 TRANsP.
PRAC. J. 320 (Spring 1994).
29 See eg., Barnard v Trenton-New Brunswick Theaters Co., 32 NJ Super 551, 108 A2d 873 (Super.
Ct. App. 1954).
30 Gettemy v Star House Movers, Inc., 225 Cal. App. 2d 636, 37 Cal. Rptr. 411 (Dist. Ct. App.
1964).
3 See e.g, Annotation, Route Driver or Salesman as Independent Contractor of Merchandise
Producer or Processor, for Purposes of Respondeat Superior Doctrine, 53 A.L.R. 2d 183 (1957).
32 Penman v Korper, 977 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1992) [Canteen, private food service vendor contracted
with the Arizona Department of Corrections to provide food service at a prison].
33 Georgia Sargeant, "Workplace Safety Group Targets Fast Food Deliveries," 29 TRIAL 95 (Sept.
1993).
34 But see, Note, "Lenders and Borrowers Beware! Secured Creditors May Not Avoid Liability for
Breaches of the Peace by Using an Independent Contractor to Carry Out Repossession (MBank El Paso, M.A.
v Sanchez, 836 SW 2d 151, Tex. 1992)," 24 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 275 (1993).
3 Ross v Texas One Partnership, 796 SW 2d 206 (Ct. App. Tex. 1990), writ denied, 34 Tex. Sup.
Ct. 293, 806 SW 2d 222 (1991).
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physicians at correctional facilities,36 rehabilitation centers or hospitals, 317 char-
ter air pilots3" and even privately operated correctional facilities.39
No conclusive rule divines whether a party is an employee or an inde-
pendent contractor.' Indeed, part of the quandary in defining the business
relationship is that no single element is controlling.41 Instead, it is a com-
bination of factual elements all of which are considered and guide the jury's
resolution of the nature of the business relationship.42 Commonly cited factors
include: whether the party is engaged in a distinct business or independent
occupation, who supplies the place, tools, supplies, and materials, the length of
time the employment is to last and the method of payment (per job basis or
weekly payroll) and independence over selection of projects or contracts to be
36 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, (1988); [independent contractor physician providing medical care
to prison inmate pursuant to contract with state department of correction, however, medical care was
nondelegable duty]; Rivers v State, 159 AD 2d 788, 552 NYS 2d 189, (App. Div. 1990) [Court reversed
lower court decision and held that the state was not liable for the negligent treatment of an inmate because
the Doctor was an independent contractor and thereby liable for his own negligence].
37 See eg., "Hospital Vicarious Liability for the Negligence of Independent Contractors and Staff
Physicians: Criticisms of Ostensible Agency Doctrine in Ohio" 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 711 (1987). See also,
DeMontiney v. Desert Manor Convalescent Ctr., 144 Ariz. 21, 695 P.2d 270 (1985).
38 Huddleston v Union Rural Electric Assn., 821 P.2d 862 (Ct. App. Colo. 1991); Giuseppe Guerreri,
"The Airport Operator: Aircarrier's Agent of Independent Contractor?" 17 AIR & SPACE L. 231 (Sept. 1992).
39 Charles W. Thomas & Linda S. Calvert Hanson, "The Implications of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 For The
Privatization of Prisons," 16 FLA. ST. U. L. RE'. 933 at 960 (Spring 1989).
40 See, e.g. Clyde Scott & Robert Culpepper, "Independent Contractors or Employees: The View
From the National Labor Relations Board," 44 LAB. LJ. 395 (July 1993); Mark A. Coel, "Distinguishing
Independent Contractors from Employees," 67 FL. B.J. 47 (Mar. 1993); John Bruntz, "The Employee/
Independent Contractor Dichotomy: A Rose is not Always a Rose," 8 HoFsTRA LAB. L.J. 337 (Spring 1991).
41 See e.g., Brenner, Donald A., "The Employers Fruitless Quest for Independent Contractor Status,"
21 CoLo. LAw. 459 (Mar. 1992); Comment, "The Definition of "Employee" under Title VII: Distinguishing
Between Employees and Independent Contractors," 53 U. ON. L. REv. 203 (1984); Richard C. Tinney,
Annotation, Trucker as Independent Contractor or Employee under §2(3) of National Labor Relations Act
(29 Uscs §152(3)), 55 A.L.R. Fed. 20 (1981); Note, Newsboys as Independent Contractors or Employees, 12
Miami L. Rev. 117 ( );- Annotation, House-to House Salesman or Canvasser as Independent Contractor
or Employee for Purposes of Respondeat Superior, 98 A.L.R. 2D 335 (1964); Debra T. Landis, Annotation,
Determination of "Independent Contractor" and "Employee" Status for Purposes of §3(e)(1) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (29 Uscs §203(e)(1)), 51 A.L.R. FED. 702 (1981).
42 This distinction between whether an injured worker is employed by an employer or an independent
contractor can have serious consequences in areas beyond liability for negligence or tort actions, such as
workers' compensation. To combat this, some states have attempted to statutorily define an independent con-
tractor. See e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. 50-6-102 (9) (1992); CoLo. REV. STAT. §8-70-103 (10)(a) (19). Also,
see, Stone v. Pinkerton Farms, Inc., 741 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1984) as an example of the number of factors in
combination that the courts consider to determine whether one is an employee or independent contractor.
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performed according to their own specifications and control the flow of the
work except as to the result of the work.43
One who exerts significant control over the physical details of the work is
characteristic of an employer-employee relationship. One who controls the
more general process by which the assignment is accomplished is evidence of
the independent contractor status." The amount and level of autonomy
exercised by the party performing the work is the hallmark of the distinction.
The right to terminate the relationship without liability can also signal an
employee relationship whereas an independent contractor could face
accountability for breach of contract for wrongful termination.' Several courts
hold that the existence of language in the contract alone is insufficient.' The
fact that the agreement purports to create a specified relationship by designating
the roles that the parties will play will not be determinative unless viewed
together with the conduct manifested by the parties. However, lacking
"extrinsic evidence indicating that the contract was a subterfuge" or the conduct
of the parties suggests otherwise, the contract will be dispositive.47 Generating
a list of factors is elementary. The challenge begins when attempting to apply
the singular elements to the facts of a specific case to detect whether an
independent contractor relationship is demonstrated. 4
8
43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, section, (19).
44 This feature was demonstrated in the oft cited case of Majestic Realty Associates, Inc. v Toti
Contracting Co., 30 NJ 425, 153 A2d 321 (1959). The Supreme Court of New Jersey explained this
distinction when interpreting a contract provision reserving to the hiring party a right of supervision "for the
purpose of seeing that the work is done in accordance with the contract and specifications. The supervisory
interest relates to the result to be accomplished, not to the means of accomplishing it." at 431, at 324.
45 See 41 AM. JUR. 2D, Independent Contractors § 19 (1968). This characteristic was emphasized
as determinative in a Colorado case, Dana's Housekeeping v Butterfield, 807 P.2d 1218 (Ct. App. Colo. 1990)
(citing to Industrial Commission of Colorado v Hammond, 236 P 1006 [Colo. 1925]).
4 Locke v Longacre, 772 P2d 685 (Ct. App. Colo. 1989); Ross v. Texas One Partnership, 796
S.W.2d 206 (Ct. App. Tex. 1990).
47 Ross at 209.
48 For example, in Wasson v Stracener, 786 SW2d 414,419-20 (DCA Tex. 1990) the appellate court
delineated that evidence presented to establish the independent contractor relationship which included that
the welder funished his own tools and equipment, and the lack of supervision over the welder's work even
though the construction company had a right of inspection. In evaluating the evidence to support the welder
being classified as an employee, the court noted the welder was paid on an hourly basis, the welder's starting
time, lunch time and quitting time were all dictated by the hirer, and that the hirer permitted the welder to
have a helper, who also was paid on an hourly basis by the hirer. On this basis, the court reversed the
summary judgment for the construction company finding that material facts were in dispute over whether the
welder was an employee or an independent contractor.
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POTENTIAL PLAINTIFFS
Proper plaintiffs in an action for negligent selection of an independent
contractor include the injured third persons, bystanders or members of the
public.49 Indeed, the plain language of the Restatement is specific in this regard
and courts have approved claims by this class of plaintiffs. There is no
consensus, however, about whether an injured employee of the independent
contractor has standing to sue the hirer for negligent selection." Section 411 of
the Second Restatement of Torts regarding negligent selection of an indepen-
dent contractor specifically states that the hiring party can be liable for
"physical harm to third persons... "(emphasis added). The notes and com-
ments in the Second Restatement make no mention of whether an employee of
the independent contractor was within the class of persons protected by this
provision. For guidance on this issue, commentators have referred back to an
Introductory Note contained within the chapter on liability for those engaging
independent contractors in a Tentative Draft of the Second Restatement. This
provision explained that, at that point, the reference to "third persons" was not
intended to include employees of the independent contractor."' The employees
of the contractors were intentionally excluded according to Dean Prosser,
because of the drafters inability to formulate a ubiquitous rule due to vast
inconsistencies among state workers' compensation statutes.5 2 In many
jurisdictions, worker's compensation covers employees of an independent
contractor and it is usually intended to be the exclusive remedy. The con-
troversy arises, of course, when the independent contractor lacks the
appropriate workers compensation coverage and is insolvent, depriving the
injured employees of essential benefits or remedies from their employer.53 Thus
begins the search for deeper pockets and a shift in focus to the conduct of the
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §411, (1965).
so See 41 AM. JUR. 2d, Independent Contractors § 42 (1968).
51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS, Special Note to Ch. 15, (Tent. Draft. No. 7, 1962) 17-18.
52 He concluded his explanation of the exclusion with the statement, "it appears undesirable, if not
impossible, to state anything at all about what the liability is to the employees of an independent contractor."
39 A.L.I. Proceedings 256 (1963). See also, 41 AM JuR 2D, Independent Contractors §26 (1968); PROSSER
ON TORTS, supra, note 2 at 514 n.63; Reuben I. Friedman, Annotation, When is Employer Chargeable with
Negligence in Hiring Careless, Reckless, or Incompetent Independent Contractor, 78 ALR 3d 910 (1973);
Thompson, Donna "Berry v. Holston Well Service, Inc.,: Statutory Employer Status-Toil Liability of Princi-
pal to Employee of Independent Contractor-Louisiana Revised Statute 23:1061," 61 Tul. L Rev. 693
(February, 1987).
53 Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1988).
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hiring party.' Even today there remains a split in the jurisdictions across the
nation on whether an independent contractor's employees are covered by this
provision.55
FACTORS USED TO DETERMINE NEGLIGENT SELECTION
For guidance in understanding the elements of the tort of negligent
selection we turn to the Restatement of the Law Second on Torts, which states
that
(A)n employer is subject to liability for physical harm to third persons
caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care to employ a competent
and careful contractor (a) to do work which will involve a risk of
physical harm unless it is skillfully and carefully done, or (b) to
perform any duty which the employer owes to third persons.56
54 Id.
55 States which have adopted the view that employees are protected include: [Arkansas] Jackson v.
Petit Jean Elec. Co-op, 270 Ark, 506, 606 SW 2d 66 (1980); [California] Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co.,
24 Cal. 3d 502, 156 Cal. Rptr. 41, 595 P.2d 619 (1979); [District of Columbia] Linder v. District of
Columbia, 502 F.2d 495 (D.C. Cir. 1974); [Hawaii] Makaneole v. Gampon, 70 Haw. 501, 777 P.2d 1183
(1989): [Iowa] Clausen v. R.W. Gilbert Constr. Co. Inc., 309 NW 2d 462 (Iowa 1981); [Maryland] Chesa-
peake & Potomac Tele. Co. of Maryland v. Chesapeake Util. Corp., 436 A.2d 314 (Del. 1981) applying Md
law; [Michigan] Warren v. McLough Steel Corp., 111 Mich App. 496, 314 NW2d 666, (Ct. App. Mich.
1981); [Mississippi] Whatley v. Delta Brokerage & Warehouse Co., 248 Miss. 416, 159 So. 2d 634 (1964);
[New Hampshire] Elliot v. Public Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, 128 N.H. 676,517 A.2d 1185 (1986); [New
York] Parsan v. New York Breweries Co., 208 NY 337, 101 NE 879 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1913); [Pennsylvania]
LeFlur v. Gulf Creek Indust. Park #2, 511 Pa 574, 515 A.2d 875 (1986); [Texas] EDCO Product., Inc. v.
Hernandez, 794 SW 2d 69 (Dist. Q. App. Tex. 1990) error den; [West Virginia] Pasquale v. Ohio Power Co.,
187 W. Va 292,418 SE 2d 738 (1992). States which have adopted the view that employees are not protected
include: [Arizona] Cordova v. Parrett, 146 Ariz 79, 703 P.2d 1228 (Ct. App. Ariz. 1985); [Connecticut] Ray
v. Schneider, 16 Conn App. 660, 548 A.2d 461 (Ct. App. Conn. 1988) cert. denied, 209 Conn 822, 551 A.2d
756; [Florida] Florida Power & Light v. Price, 170 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1964); [Idaho] Peone v. Regulus Stud
Mills, Inc., 113 Idaho 374,744 P.2d 102 (1987); [Indiana] Johns v. New York Blower Co., 442 N.E.2d 382
(Ct. App. Ind. 1982); [Kentucky] King v. Shelby Rural Electric Co-op Corp., 502 SW 2d 659 (Ky. 1973)
reh'g denied, U.S. cert. denied, 417 US 932 (1974); [Massachusetts] Vertentes v. Barletta Co. Inc., 392
Mass. 165, 466 NE 2d 500 (1984); [Minnesota] Conover v. Northern States Power Co., 313 NW 2d 397
(Minn. 1981); [Nevada] Sierra Pacific Power Co. v. Rinehart, 665 P.2d 270 (1983); [New Mexico] Valdez
v. Cillessen & Son, Inc., 105 N.M. 575, 723 P.2d 1258 (1987); [South Dakota] Hagberg v. City of Sioux
Falls, 281 F.Supp. 460 (D. S.D. 1968); [Tennessee] Cooper v. Metro Gov't. of Nashville, 628 SW2d 30 (Ct.
App. Tenn. 1981); [Washington] Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power and Light Co., 96 Wash 2d 274, 635 P.2d
426 (1981); [Wisconsin] Wagner v. Continental Gas Co., 143 Wisc. 2d 379, 421 NW 2d 835 (1988);
[Wyoming] Jones v. Chevron U.S.C. Inc., 718 P.2d 890 (Wyo. 1986).
56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS §411 (1965).
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As will be shown through analysis of the cases to follow, there are multiple
factors that the courts' contemplate before ruling whether a hiring entity
negligently selected a particular independent contractor who was incompetent.
The Restatement explains that the "words 'competent and careful contractor'
denote a contractor who possesses the knowledge, skill, experience, and
available equipment which a reasonable man would realize that a contractor
must have in order to do the work which he is employed to do without creating
unreasonable risk of injury to others, and who also possesses the personal
characteristics which are equally necessary."57 The selection of an independent
contractor requires the exercise of that amount of care that a reasonable person
would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.5" Of course, the level
and type of knowledge, skill, experience and available equipment necessary for
a competent independent contractor will be fact specific. That is, the measure
of competence will depend upon the type of service to be provided by the
independent contractor. The Restatement of Torts identifies three elements for
examination: (1) the danger to which others will be exposed if the contractor's
work is not properly done; (2) the character of the work to be done-whether
the work lies within the competence of the average person or is work that can
be properly done only by persons possessing special skill and training; and (3)
the existence of a relation between the parties that imposes upon the one a
peculiar duty of protecting the other.59
Assume for example that you are contracting for the protective services of
a security guard. Relevant inquiries to detect the guard's competency would
include: the guard's formal training in the use of force and firearms, whether
the guard was licensed as a security guard and licensed to carry a weapon, the
level of expertise in the use of firearms coupled with an inquiry into whether
the guard maintains his/her level of expertise by routine practice. So too would
an inquiry into whether the guard has previously been involved in a confronta-
tional situation during the discharge of his duties along with the results of the
encounter.60 In Ross v. Texas One Partnership6l this level of inquiry constituted
S I ld.
$' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §411 (1965).
I ld.
6 See, 11 P.O.F. 2d 499 at 522, Lack of Care in Selecting an Independent Contractor, Robert A.
Brazener, Annotation, Liability of One Contracting for Private Police or Security Service for Acts of
Personnel Supplied, 38 A.L.R. 3d 1332 (1971). See also, Del Signore v. Pyramid Security Services, Inc., 147
A.D.2d 759, 537 N.Y.S. 2d 640 (App. Div. N.Y. 1989).
61 796 SW 2d 206 (Ct. App. Tex 1990).
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due diligence. In this case, the hiring entity, an apartment complex, received
documentation showing that the security company was licensed by the state.
Further, two of the references were verified by the hiring party who received
favorable reports from the previous users of the security company's services.62
The court indicated that this level of scrutiny was sufficient to fulfill the apart-
ment complex's duty to its residents.
Another case examining the level of inquiry into the competence of an
independent contractor by a hiring entity is Philip Morris, Inc. v. Emerson.6" In
this case the Virginia Supreme Court stated that "Philip Morris engaged A-Line
[the independent contractor] without any investigation of its competence to
perform an admittedly dangerous task" of disposing of toxic chemicals from
pressurized tanks.' The court then discussed the impropriety involved in the
hiring entity's reliance upon the independent contractor's "self serving
brochure describing [the independent contractors] activities and personnel"
which was later discovered to be erroneous 65 "A perusal of a contractor's self-
serving brochure is not sufficient to discharge an employer's duty of reasonable
care to employ a contractor who is competent to perform a dangerous task."'
Further, the court noted that no references were checked nor were any inquiries
made to learn whether the contractor had previous experience dealing with
pressurized cylinders containing toxic chemicals. Clearly, the level and type of
care to be exercised by the hiring entity will vary as the circumstances vary.
After acknowledging these qualifiers regarding variations in the requisite level
and types of investigation, we can turn to the factors weighed by the courts in
determining whether due care was exercised in the selection of an independent
contractor.
Reputation and Experience
The next area of inquiry concerns the reputation and past experience of the
independent contractor. An employer can justifiably rely upon a previous
successful pattern of work performed by an independent contractor.67 Evidence
62 Id. at 216.
63 235 Va 380, 368 SE 2d 268 (1988).
6 Id. at 278.
6 Id.
66 Id.
67 See Cooper v. Metro. Gov't. of Nashville, 628 SW2d 30 (CA Tenn. 1981) in which the indepen-
dent contractor had been performing the same or similar work "for... 20 years, apparently without incident."
at 31.
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that the contractor's past performance with the employer was satisfactory and
incident free coupled with proof that the contractor engaged a competent and
seasoned supervisor present at the work site precluded liability on the theory of
negligent selection of an independent contractor.6"
Presenting a contrast is a case in which a couple was injured when their car
was rear-ended by a truck transporting forty-thousand pounds of steel after the
tractor-trailer's brakes failed. In L.B. Foster Company v. Hurnblad,69 a
negligent selection case, the court discussed numerous general factors to
evaluate the competence of the independent contractor." These factors included
the transporter's "lack of experience, poor financial condition, failure to respect
federal [transportation] certificate requirements, and willingness to do business
at cut-rates."' The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals recounted that substantial
proof had been offered to the jury, enough to justify the conclusion that it was
"a fly-by-night operation."'72 This evidence included: that the independent con-
tractor had only been in business for six months before the accident, it had only
a telephone number and post office box, others in the trucking business in the
area had never heard of the company, and the contractor offered to transport
without the required federal certificates at illegal cut-rate prices. 73 The court
continued, however, to evaluate whether the hiring entity "knew, or in the exer-
cise of reasonable care, should have known, of [the independent contractor's]
incompetence."74 The court opined that even though there was no evidence of
actual knowledge of incompetence by the hiring party, the shipper's experience
with the weight and bulk of the goods being shipped compelled a suitable
inquiry into the competence of the independent contractor, which was clearly
lacking." The court also stated that evidence solely of a single act of previous
8 See Henderson Bros. Stores, Inc. v Smiley, 120 Cal. App.3d 903, 174 Cal. Rptr. 875 (C.A. Cal.
1981) in which the hiring of a licensed roofing contractor who had been in business for many years, and who
had been previously employed by that employer three to four times per year for the past four years, presented
no evidence of negligent selection. See also, Western Arkansas Telephone Company v Cotton, 259 Ark. 216,
532 SW 2d 424 (1976).
9 418 F. 2d 727 (9th Cir. 1969).
70 L.B. Foster Co. v Hurnblad, 418 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1969).
11 Id. at 730.
7 Id.
7 Id.
74 Id.
" M For a diffeent perspective, see, Stone v. Pinkerton Farms, Inc., 741 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1984)
wherein evidence was presented that the soy bean hauler had been hauling periodically for the hiring farmer
for approximately six months, the hauler had six speeding tickets, lacked insurance coverage and an ICC
permit but did possess a valid chauffeur's license. Further, the hiring party had checked his reference and
received a good recommendation about the hauler, The appellate court ruled that receiving the favorable
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negligence by the independent contractor would be insufficient to presume
incompetence. Proof of multiple acts, however, could produce an inference of
carelessness.76
An Illinois court ruled that proof of an independent contractor's sobriety
was material evidence for the jury to consider as it related to the welder's
general reputation. In Woodward v. Mettille," a fire that started following the
welding of scrap metal in a dilapidated wooden warehouse, burned down the
employing party's building and a third party's business. Allegations included:
that the warehouse owner had sufficient knowledge of the incompetence of the
independent contractor in that the welder was operating his torches
dangerously, that he had a reputation for being careless and that on several
occasions he had seen the welder inside the building under the influence of
alcohol. The welder testified that he had three beers at lunch that day and a
witness testified that when the welder left the building before the fire broke out,
there was a half-pint of whiskey was visible in the welder's back pocket.
Despite contrary evidence as to the qualifications of the welder who was
portrayed as a "careful and experienced welder" who had a good reputation in
the community by another witness, the jury entered a verdict against the
defendants. Hurnblad and Woodward contained several distinct components
that courts use to evaluate the experience and reputation of an independent
contractor such as length of time in business, their standing among the
tradespersons, their skills, their work practices and the number of previous
dealings with a particular client. Additionally the use of alcohol on the job site
can be an element of reputation factored in by some jurisdictions in deciding
the competence of an independent contractor.
Licensing
Another indicium of the independent contractor's proficiency is whether
the contractor possesses the appropriate license. In Watsontown Brick Co. v.
Hercules Powder Co.78 a hiring party's reliance upon knowledge that an
independent contractor was licensed to conduct blasting was deemed to be an
recommendation was "sufficient to satisfy the duty to exercise ordinary care" and that the hiring farmer
"breached no duty by failing to inquire as to any traffic tickets ... [or] to ascertain whether [the hauler] had
any permits" at 946.
76 Id. at 730. See also, Bagley v Insight Communications Co., 623 N.E.2d 440 (Dist. Ct. App. Ind.
1994).
7 81 Ill. App.3d 168, 400 N.E.2d 934, 36 M11. Dec. 354 (C.A. 1980).
79 265 F. Supp. 268 (M.D. Pa. 1967)
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insufficient indicator of competence. Evidence was introduced that the indepen-
dent contractor had received his blasting license under a grandfather clause.
The fact that the contractor took no examination and had no previous
experience in blasting under these unique circumstances weighed more heavily
in the opinion of the court.79
In another case, the owner of a motel engaged the services of a licensed
plumber to repair a faulty hot water heater which subsequently exploded killing
a guest." The plaintiffs alleged that the motel owner negligently selected the
licensed plumber who was not properly qualified to make the repair in that the
hot water heater repair should have been done by a licensed electrician. The
defendants contended that they reasonably relied upon the plumber, an
independent contractor, to make the repair and they had no reason to know that
the malfunction was in the electric thermostat in the hot water heater that would
require the services of a licensed electrician. The North Carolina Appellate
Court held that "the evidence of the repairs and maintenance performed on the
electrical system of defendants' electric hot water heater by [the independent
contractor] tends to affirm the incompetence of defendants' independent con-
tractor as an electrician" and to show negligence "in failing to secure the
services of a competent independent contractor. ..."" One disturbing facet of
this case is that the motel owner justifiably relied upon a licensed plumber
which is arguably, reasonable conduct under these facts. 2 The average person
would have no reason to realize that the repairs called for a skilled electrician.
Therefore, it seems that the party who should have perceived that he was
incompetent to perform the required repairs was the plumber. He would be in
the best position to recognize that the steps necessary to correct the problem
with the electric thermostat were beyond his qualifications as a licensed
plumber. This case places a high burden on the hiring party who is not in all
likelihood called upon to contract out for these specific services routinely. 3
79 Id. at 271.
so Page v. Sloan, 12 N.C. App. 433, 183 S.E. 2d 813 (Ct. App. N.C. 1971).
81 Id. at 817.
92 Indeed, as is discussed in the comment c of §411 of the Restatement, a person employing "a
carpenter to repair the ceilings of his shop or to install plumbing in his hotel is entitled to assume that a
carpenter or plumber of good reputation is competent to do such work safely. In such case, there is no duty
to make an elaborate investigation as to the competence of the carpenter or plumber."
93 Comment c of §411 of the Restatement also differentiates between the types of persons contracting
out for the services of an independent contractor. A contrast is demonstrated between an "inexperienced
widow" engaging a building contractor who "is not to be expected to have the same information concerning
the competence and carefulness of building contractors in the community, or to exercise the same judgment,
as would a bank seeking to" engage a building contractor.
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The absence of a commercial pilot's license as required by law to crop dust
coupled with the lack of a special permit to spray chemicals were factors cited
in an Arkansas case alleging selection of an incompetent independent
contractor by a farmer.' The farmer alleged that it was not the custom or
practice among farmers engaging crop dusters to ask about the adequacy of
their licensure. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's ruling that this evi-
dence was inadmissible. Other facts established in this case included that the
22-year old pilot possessed only a student-pilot's license, he had limited
experience in this type of plane, and he had dusted crops for only one other
farmer once, all of which were sufficient to allow the issue to be submitted to
the jury. A corollary aspect of licensing relevant to an independent contractor's
competency in certain circumstances is the possession of a driver's license and
solid driving record if driving is required as part of one's job. 5
Equipment
The Restatement explains that one facet of a competent or a careful
contractor presumes the contractor will have or use adequate equipment of the
type that a reasonable person would realize was required to perform the contract
work without creating an unreasonable risk to others.s' Deciding the suitability
of a contractor's equipment is usually a factual issue for the jury. In Hudgens
v. Cook Industries, Inc. 'a wheat hauler caused an accident resulting in injuries
to a passenger in another vehicle. The plaintiff maintained that the independent
4 Riddell v. Little, 253 Ark. 686, 488 S.S.2d 34 (1972). The court did note the connexity problem
in that bare evidence of non-compliance with the statutory requirement did not by itself establish the causation
of the accident which killed a spotter on the ground. See also, Annotation, Jonathan M. Purver, Crop Dusting,
Liability for Injuries Caused by Spraying or Dusting of Crops, 37 A.L.R.3d 833 §§3-5 (1971).
95 Wasson v. Stracener, 786 SW2d 414 (Ct. App. Tex. 1990) a case which involved a welder's helper
who was a passenger in a car enroute to a pipeline construction site. The welder's helper was severely injured
when the car was involved in an accident. The plaintiff contended negligent selection of an independent
contractor alleging that the hiring party failed to investigate the driving record of the contractor (the driver of
the car) which would have revealed multiple speeding tickets and prior accidents. The court responded by
pointing out that an employer is required to determine an employee's driving ability "only if performance of
the contract includes driving a vehicle" at 421. The court continued its analysis by concluding that because
the independent contractor was required to get his truck and tools to the construction site to perform his work,
"his driving record would be pertinent to his employment." Id. See also, Gomien v. Wear-Ever Aluminum,
Inc. 50 lll.2d 19, 276 NE 2d 336 (1971) a case wherein the court stated that a hiring company may be liable
for the negligent selection of an independent contractor by not determining that a salesman who was required
to drive to make his sales calls had a bad driving record.
86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §411 (1965).
8 521 P.2d 813 (Okla. 1974).
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contractor was an incompetent, unfit driver operating defective and unsafe
equipment.8" It was said that the truck was "grossly defective and unsafe for
operation."89 Testimony revealed that the tires were threadbare, the axles had
been re-welded, the speedometer was defective and the brakes malfunctioned
because they were worn completely through. Besides the poor condition of the
truck when it was empty, at the time of the accident it was 13,000 pounds over-
weight and the driver was speeding on a wet road. Testimony demonstrated that
the wheat owners who contracted for the hauling services made no effort to
screen or determine the qualifications of the drivers or their equipment. Instead,
they just "assumed" everything was in order.' The Supreme Court of
Oklahoma recognized that because the employing party regularly hired truckers
in a commercial enterprise, they had a duty to discover the competence of the
driver and the driver's equipment.
Financial Responsibility
A more troublesome component of evaluating the competency of an
independent contractor concerns their financial state. Back in 1965 the author's
of the Restatement dodged this issue by stating that they held no opinion about
whether the employing party had an obligation to investigate the financial
affairs of a potential contractor. Their justification was that "cases are lacking
in sufficient number to deal with the question of whether the employer may
ever be responsible to any third person for his failure to exercise care to employ
a contractor who is financially responsible, and therefore able to respond, by
liability insurance or otherwise, for any damages which he may inflict by his
tortious conduct." 91 The primary case commenting on the financial responsibil-
ity aspect up to that time was Majestic Realty Associates, Inc. v. Toti
Contracting Co., Inc.92 In Majestic, the city hired an independent contractor,
Toti Contracting, to raze a building that during demolition, collapsed onto an
adjacent third party's business [Majestic] causing substantial property damage.
U The evidence presented regarding the incompetency of the driver included that he "was a reckless
driver with a lengthy history of prior arrests and accidents; he consistently and repeatedly hauled loads in
excess of the legal weight limits .. . ; he was a person with a lengthy history of drinldng intoxicating
beverages while operating motor vehicles [he had been drinking before the accident]; he had no permit to haul
grain within the State... "and so on.
9 Id. at 814.
90 Id.
91 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § , (1965)
92 30 N.J. 425, 153 A.2d 321 (1959).
BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
Majestic brought an action against the city alleging multiple counts including
hiring an incompetent independent contractor. In a discussion of the policy
issues involved in assessing responsibility against the hiring party, the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court emphasized the fact that these cases balance the interest of
an innocently harmed third party against the party contracting for the work, who
can choose the contractor. Therefore, "in the application of concepts of
distributive justice perhaps much can be said for the view that a loss arising out
of the tortious conduct of a financially irresponsible contractor should fall on
the contractee."' The supreme court declined to expressly rle on the financial
incompetency issue as it was not raised in the lower court.
Only a few cases decided after this time, however, have dealt with the issue
of a contractor's financial responsibility.' The most oft cited and somewhat
controversial case is Becker v. Interstate Properties.95 This New Jersey case
was filed after the independent contractor, driving a heavy truck, drove over a
construction worker. The seriously injured worker alleged that the hiring party,
a shopping center developer, was negligent for allowing a "financially-
irresponsible" contractor to be hired.96 Evidence established that the contractor
was "only minimally capitalized" and had inadequate insurance coverage.9 The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting in diversity, noted the absence of a case
directly on point but looked to Majestic for guidance and attempted to construe
the New Jersey Supreme Court's dicta and apply it to the case at hand. The
Third Circuit noted that although no subsequent cases were evaluated under
liability for a financially impaired contractor similar to Majestic, the case
generated numerous articles and commentary. 98 In a discussion of the allocation
of risks and resources, the Third Circuit declared that the developer was a
"substantial entrepreneur and a member of an industry that carries large liability
insurance policies as a matter of course" who therefore, was in a stronger
93 Id. at 325.
9 See, Lakeview Terrace Homeowners Assoc., v. Le Rivage, Inc., 498 N.W.2d 68 at 71 (Ct. App.
Minn. 1993) wherein the appellate court refused to assess liability on the hiring party after recognizing that
"the weight of authority supports not imposing liability on an employer ... for hiring an apparently competent
contractor. ... that turns out to be judgment proof." See also, Holland v. Dolese Company, 643 P.2d 317 at
321 (Okla. 1982) wherein the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that it was error to submit the issue of an
incompetent contractor to the jury on the allegation that the contractor was in "poor financial condition" and
willing to "do business on a low margin of profit" without a showing of how those elements constituted an
incompetent contractor.
569 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1988).
S id. at 1205.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1208 n.18.
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position to accept the loss and pass the cost on to the project users than was the
injured worker.' After an examination of policy reasons underlying tort law in
New Jersey, the Third Circuit indicated their belief that the New Jersey court
would rule that "the failure to engage a properly solvent or adequately insured
subcontractor is a violation of the duty to obtain a competent independent
contractor."' "tu This decision provoked a sharp dissent by Circuit Judge Hunter
who stated his view that the majority had succeeded in conceiving a new duty
in tort law not previously reflected in any jurisdiction across the nation."0
The Becker decision did not pass unregarded. Subsequent criticism from
the New Jersey courts chided the Third Circuit for taking undue liberties trying
to predict the future course of New Jersey law.I12 As the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey stated in 1990, "Becker illustrates the
vicissitudes of predicting state high court decisions .... Although Becker's
holding may ultimately be adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court, the
history of Becker shows that when a federal court divines state common law,
it is merely writing in the sand."'0 3
Casting the Becker decision as writing in the sand proved accurate. The
Third Circuit revisited the issue in 1993 and reversed its findings. In Robinson
v. Jiffy Executive Limousine Co.,t°4 the Third Circuit deliberated the issue of the
pecuniary status of an independent contractor and retreated from its previous
decision in Becker. The court painstakingly set out the basis for their ability to
disregard their previous decision on the same issue. After noting the criticism
' I id. at 1210.
100 Id. at 1209.
101 Id. at 1215.
102 Indeed, in Cassano v. Aschoff, 226 N.J. Super 110, 543 A.2d 973 (Super. Ct. N.J. 1988) when
called upon the decide the issue of the financial instability of an independent contractor as indicative of
incompetence, the court tersely declared. "[a]lthough no court in this state, either before Majestic, or in the
intervening nineteen years had chosen to apply that concept, the majority in Becker nevertheless predicted
that future New Jersey courts would do so. No court has since chosen to follow that lead. In these
circumstances, nor do we." at 116. See also, Miltz v. Bonzoughs-Shelving, Div. of Lear Siegler, Inc., 203 N.J.
Super. 451,497 A.2d 516 (1985).
103 Gutman v. Howard Savings Bank, 748 F.Supp. 254 (D. NJ. 1990). The Seventh Circuit was also
called upon to assess the relevance of a lack of insurance and a subsequent filing of bankruptcy by a
independent contractor in Stone v. Pinkerton Farms, Inc., 741 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1984). The court noted the
lack of Indiana cases on the issue and surveyed opinions from other jurisdictions on this issue including
Becker. The Seventh Circuit Court found no indication that the Indiana courts were moving toward an
expansion of their state tort doctrine to recognize financial responsibility as a basis for negligent selection of
an incompetent contractor and consequently deferred to the legislature or the Indiana courts to adopt any
changes as they saw fit. Id. at 947.
104 . 4 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 1993).
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that grew out of their previous decision coupled with the fact that the New
Jersey court flatly refused to adhere to "their" rule, the Third Circuit adopted
a more "conservative approach."' 5 The court recognized the precarious
position that would be imposed on contractors seeking to be competitive in the
marketplace while lacking start-up capital which was an original concern of the
dissent in Becker. Further, it also acknowledged the burden imposed on the
hiring parties who "would be obliged to make a diligent and continuing inquiry
into the financial qualifications of the contractor before calling upon him to per-
form the... service .... "to preclude exposure to liability for hiring an
incompetent contractor. 10 The Third Circuit conceded that not only would the
imposition of that duty be unprecedented but, it "would indeed impose
prohibitive obligations" on the hiring party "beyond what we are prepared to
predict the New Jersey Supreme Court will adopt."'" Although the element of
proof of financial responsibility appeared to be a viable consideration in
evaluating the competence of an independent contractor, its significance
appears to be marginal at this time.
CAUSATION
Proof of a contractor's negligence creates no presumption that the employer
was negligent in the selection of the contractor."°8 Nor does proof of the
individual elements of negligent selection absent a legal connection to the
injury provide an adequate basis upon which to impose liability on the hiring
party. As explained in the comments in the Restatement, to subject the
employer to liability, it must be shown that injury resulted
from some quality in the contractor which made it negligent for the
employer to entrust the work to him. Thus, if the incompetence of the
contractor consists in his lack of skill and experience or of adequate
equipment but not in any previous lack of attention or diligence in
applying such experience and skill or using such equipment as he
possesses, the employer is subject to liability for any harm caused by
Jo Id. at 242.
106 Id. at 242.
107 Id.
los 57 C.J.S.2d Master and Servant, §592 at 369.
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the contractor's lack of skill, experience, or equipment, but not for any
harm caused solely by the contractor's inattention or negligence.'°9
This connection between the inexperience of the contractor and the harm
which occurred was demonstrated in a case previously mentioned. Phillip
Morris concerned an inexperienced independent contractor hired to dispose of
pressurized cylinders containing hazardous chemicals."° The Virginia Supreme
Court concluded that there was "no conflict in the evidence of [the hiring
party's] failure to investigate and that "there can be no doubt that [the inde-
pendent contractor's] incompetence was the ultimate cause of the losses
claimed in this case."' In this case, the failure to thoroughly investigate the
contractor coupled with the hiring of the untrained contractor was the cause of
the harm, thus providing the requisite linkage.
A case failing to substantiate the proximate cause connection is Wilson v.
Good Humor Corp.12 In this case a wrongful death action was initiated for the
death of a three-year-old girl who was struck by a car while crossing a street to
reach a Good Humor ice cream truck which was operated by an independent
contractor. Allegations lodged against Good Humor included selection of an
incompetent independent contractor. Evidence was presented that Good Humor
did not use reasonable care in the selection of their independent contractors
premised on the fact that no background inquiries were conducted and that they
testified that "Good Humor would have 'no reason' to turn down any
applicant."'" 3 While acknowledging that "this aggressive indifference to the
fitness of its vendor might well subject Good Humor to liability under a
negligent selection theory," the court noted that the plaintiff's failed to produce
evidence that the ice cream driver was in fact incompetent and that this
incompetence was the proximate cause of the death of the child." 4
Another case demonstrating the proximate cause requirement is Hixon v.
Sherwin-Williams Company."5 This case involved a linoleum contractor who
was called upon to glue sheets of plywood to a floor prior to the application of
the linoleum, a task he had never specifically performed before although he had
been a reputable flooring contractor for many years. The flooring contractor
109 Id.
110 lnfra, note 57.
III Id. at 278.
112 757 F.2d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1309.
"1 671 F.2d 1005 (7th Cir. 1982).
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neglected to read the instructions on the glue can warning to use the glue only
in a well-ventilated areas. The glue was applied in a confined area, exploded
and a fire broke out. The Seventh Circuit declared that even if the hiring party
was negligent for hiring a contractor who had no experience with this particular
project, that act was not the proximate cause of the accident. The flooring
contractor's failure to read and heed the warnings printed on the glue can
caused the fire, not his inexperience in laying this type of floor."6 The court
continued to say that the accident was not more likely to occur because of his
inexperience. If anything, one would expect a contractor performing a new task
to be more careful than one would who had experience." 7 The court thus
concluded that the hiring of an inexperienced contractor was not the proximate
cause of the mishap in this case."18 For a claim of negligent selection to
succeed, therefore, it must be established that some unsuitable feature or
characteristic of the contractor that the engaging party knew of or reasonably
should have discovered proximately caused the harm sustained.
DAMAGES
Embedded in the negligent selection provision of the Restatement is the
criteria that damages result from physical harm. "An employer is subject to
liability for physical harm to third persons" caused by his negligent selection
of a competent contractor to perform "work which will involve a risk of
physical harm" unless it is done carefully or "to perform any duty which the
employer owes to third persons." 9 As made evident from the cases discussed,
the physical harm component is not rigidly followed. For example, in
Henderson Brothers Stores, Inc.,' ° in Western Stock Center, iM., in
Woodward," and in Hixon " the damages requested were for compensation for
losses to physical property (buildings and a home) due to fires. In Oregon
Portland Cement Co.,l" the damages were for the additional monetary
116 Id. at 1010.
117 l This certainly presents a different twist on the experience requirement as discussed infra note
68-78.
113 Id.
"9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 411, (1965) (emphasis provided).
120 Supra, note 65.
1 Supra, note 26.
In Supra, note 74.
123 Supra, note 112.
124 Supra, note 124.
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expenses involved in continuing the quarry operations following unsuccessful
blasting. In Majestic Realty Associates, Inc. " and Watsontown Brick Co., " the
losses sustained were to physical property (buildings) due to blasting and
demolition work. None of these cases made mention of the occurrence of
physical harm nor was relief in the form of damages for physical harm, as
indicated in the black-letter rule of the Restatement's definition of the tort of
negligent selection, requested. How did these courts deal with this enlargement
of damages beyond the scope of the Restatement? Most did not. Indeed, the
only reference in any of these seven cases is contained in Watsontown Brick
Co., wherein the federal court sitting in diversity opined, "(a)lthough the case
at bar did not involve physical injuries to people, but injuries to personalty of
Watsontown, the reasoning behind the rule.., is applicable here."' 27 In a
number of jurisdictions then, it appears that by judicial extension property
damages will also be compensated.
DEFENSES
Defenses that can be raised by the hiring party to counter a claim of
negligent selection include evidence of an indemnity agreement or release and
sovereign immunities. An early case involving blasting in a shale quarry dealt
with the issue of a signed release. In Oregon Portland Cement Co., v E.I.
DuPont De Nemours & Co.,"2 the party who engaged the independent contrac-
tor, DuPont, raised the defense of an express release and produced the signed
contract that sought to indemnify and hold DuPont harmless from negligence.
On the issue of whether the contract language relieved the hiring party from
liability for negligence in choosing an incompetent and inexperienced
contractor, the court expressed the opinion that the release did not preclude
liability on that basis. 29 Another federal trial level court reached a similar
conclusion regarding the impact of an indemnification agreement in a more
recent blasting case by stating that the contract provision did not relieve the
hiring entity from liability for selecting an incompetent or inexperienced
person. 1" A more complex defense is presented when examining the sovereign
immunity doctrines. Government entities routinely contract out for services
125 Supra, note 89.
126 Supra, note 75.
127 265 F.Supp. 268 at 271 (M.D. Pa. 1967).
129 118 F.Supp. 603 (D. Ore. 1953).
129 Id.
130 Watsontown Brick Company v. Hercules Powder Co., 265 F. Supp. 268 (M.D. Pa. 1967).
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utilizing independent contractors. In predicaments in which injuries or damages
occur because of action by the independent contractor, the federal government
can hide behind its shield of immunity. In 1946 Congress enacted the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346 thereby waiving governmental immunity from
suit under enumerated circumstances. The Act seeks to hold government
accountable in a manner similar to that which would confront a private person.
One area still protected from suit under the Act is for claims "based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government whether or not the discretion involved was abused."'' Subsequent
cases have applied this provision to the award of government contracts to
independent contractors and have concluded that the awarding function is
exempt from liability because it involves a "discretionary function or duty."'
In essence, cases alleging the negligent selection of an independent contractor
by an agent of the federal government have been unsuccessful because the gov-
ernment asserts its immunity for the discretionary function involved in the
decision to award the contract to a particular provider. For example, in Lipka
v. United States.3a an independent contractor was engaged to modify sections
of a River Lock and Dam owned by the United States. Following the collapse
of a cofferdam and the death of several workers within the dam, a suit was
filed. Evidence offered cast doubt on the competency of the independent
contractor. These evidentiary factors included: that the contractor had
performed poorly on previous government contracts, a pre-award survey
recommended that the contractor not even be considered for the contract award,
and that the Small Business Administration had denied the contractor a certif-
icate of competency for the project." Despite these indications of a less than
desirable contractor, he received the contract award. After serious problems
developed, the subsequent challenge of negligent selection of an incompetent
contractor failed due to the immunity protection. The federal government was
not held accountable for its decision to award the contract to an incompetent
contractor.
In another case a woman was killed at her place of employment, a
manufacturer of antitank explosives for the U.S. Army. 3 ' The independent
13 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
132 Gowdy v. United States, 412 F.2d 525 (6th Cir. 1969).
13 249 F. Supp. 213 (N.D. N.Y. 1965).
34 Id. at 216.
135 Toole v. United States, 443 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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contractor agreed to do work that was inherently dangerous and created a
"peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions were taken"
136and other multiple counts beyond just the negligent selection allegation. The
peculiar risk of physical harm provision failed because the waiver of immunity
contained within the FTCA did not extend to claims of vicarious liability for
those not employed by the United States. The court concluded that this count
alleged vicarious liability that was protected by the FTCA, not personal
liability.'37 As to the negligent selection count, the court held that the decision
to award the contract for the fuze rockets to this particular contractor "un-
doubtedly considered a number of 'policy factors' in arriving at their decision.
Items such as the type and quantity of fuzes needed, the amount of each
contractor's bid, the responsiveness of each bid, the fitness of each bidder, the
location of each bidder, the quality of work that could be expected from each
bidder, the past performance of those bidders who had previously held other
government contracts, and the ability of each bidder to comply with detailed
safety specifications are among the considerations that were probably weighed
in reaching the decision." '38 Therefore, the discretionary role involved in
selecting the independent contractor was "not reviewable under the Federal
Tort Claim Act."'39 Challenges to negligent retention of an incompetent
independent contractor similarly fail under the protected discretionary function
exception." While the law at the federal level regarding negligent selection of
an independent contractor is relatively clear, the implications for state or local
level contract awards depends upon the extent of the individual states waiver
of sovereign immunity. 4
CONCLUSION
Independent contractors continue to contribute a variety of indispensable
services to private individuals and commercial enterprises. Traditionally these
136 Another exception to the non-liability of the hiring entity for acts of the independent contractor
previously discussed infra, notes 12-14.
137 Id. at 1217.
13 Id. at 1222.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1223.
14' See, e.g., Jane Marshall Gagne, "New Mexico Imposes Strict Liability on a Private Employer of
an Independent Contractor for Harm From Dangerous Work, but Bestows Immunity on a Government
Employer: Saiz v. Belen School District," 23 N.M. L Rev. 399 (spring 1993); DeMontiney v. Desert Manor
Convalescent Ctr., 144 Ariz. 21, 695 P.2d 270 (1985).
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contractors were used in blue collar employment settings. This gave rise to the
ability to litigate on the basis of negligent selection for personal injury or
property damages which was more likely to occur around those types of work
environments. More recently, we have witnessed an expansion of the
employment of independent contractors into white collar areas. Today it is not
uncommon to encounter such service providers as contract attorney who
provide legal defense representation on an "as needed" basis, or attorney's who
contract out for accounting and tax services, or appraisals for their clients.
Independent contractors are being engaged in other professions as real estate
brokers, dealers representatives, physicians, home care nurses, and computer
specialists. Most of these contractors provide services that foreseeably could
result in economic harm to third persons as opposed to the more traditionally
recognized losses such as physical harm or property damage. Given the ease of
the court's transition from allowing damages for physical harm to allowing
claims seeking awards for property losses, we may find that the courts are more
willing to compensate third parties for economic harm as well. Up to this point,
there is a dearth of cases arguing negligent selection of professionals, due in
part, to the ability of litigants to pursue professional claims under malpractice
actions. In the future, however, we should expect to see greater accountability
for the negligent selections of these types of professionals for economic harms
occasioned.
One other trend seems noteworthy. The cases we examined involved
predominately disputes in a commercial context where the employing party was
called upon to contract out for services that they themselves could not provide.
As articulated by the judiciary, the level of inquiry and the factors germane to
a determination of the competency of an independent contractor seems to be an
elevated degree of common sense, except of course, when the government
contracts for services in which case it is immune. The clear message is that
some measure of exploration into the contractor's background must be
undertaken, one just cannot assume that they are competent.
Although most of the cases were commercial in nature, it would be ill-
advised to assume that the average person contracting for services would not
be bound by these same indicators of a competent contractor and the same need
to conduct a pre-hiring screening. Indeed, one concern is that the motivation for
individuals to contract for the services of an independent contractor is that they
recognize that they are not qualified to handle a particular job. They must rely,
therefore, upon the expertise or skills of someone who holds themselves out to
be a specialist. Further, at times for example, the homeowner contracts out to
rectify a potentially dangerous condition on their property such as the removal
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of a rotting tree ready to fall onto the property of a neighbor or for the trimming
of tree limbs that are precariously close to utility wires. Most homeowners are
not aware of the techniques involved in tree removal, or the appropriate type of
tools and equipment that should be used, so by what process do they evaluate
the competence of an independent contractor? Typically, the average person
faced with needing services of this type would turn to the yellow pages of their
telephone book and pick the vendor with the "best" ad or call for a price
comparisons. These folks could find themselves in the position of an unwary
victim in a no-win situation, liable if they do not correct the known defect and
liable if they do not select a competent contractor, who they lack the ability to
judge. The authors of the Restatement in their comments recognized this
potential dilemma and at least raised the distinction, although not directly
addressing the difference in standards that wouldbe appropriate.
One needs to be mindful that the search for "deep pockets" can be a
motivating factor in seeking to pursue the hiring party under a negligent
selection theory. Therefore, the best offensive move for any employ-
er-including private citizens who engage independent contractors-is to
create a strong defense through careful preparation. Exercising due care
through a pre-hiring screening is a vital course for preventing complications.
At a minimum, this screening should include a thorough background inquiry
into the reputation and experience of the contractor, including learning whether
the contractor has complied with licensing requirements and possesses
appropriate equipment. Further, the inquiry should involve a consideration of
whether the contractor is bonded, possesses adequate insurance coverage and
appears financially responsible. The final phase of the inquiry should be a veri-
fication of references by contacting past clients served by the contractor. A
careful pre-hiring screening should help shield the employing party from
liability. After all, "the best offense is a good defense."

